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I. Introduction
In his case note in EStAL 2012/2 Pierpaoli Rossi-Mac-
canico hailed the ECJ’s judgment in joined cases
C-106/09 P and C 107/09 P Commission and Kingdom
of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United King-
dom (hereafter: Gibraltar) as a landmark judgment
which finally clarified the application of the mater-
ial selectivity test of Article 107 (1) TFEU.1 Maccian-
ico convincingly predicted that the ECJ’s judgment
inGibraltarwill stand the test of time, resting on the
pillars of Hercules, since the ECJ focussed its ap-
praisal on the effect of the tax measures involved
and not on the underlying goals.2 Moreover, the ECJ
interpreted the selectivity test basically as a non-dis-
crimination test. As a result the Gibraltar judgment
has remained the rock on which the ECJ has built its
subsequent case law. Despite this fact the interpre-
tation of the selectivity criterion, and indeed the
Gibraltar judgment, has not always been consistent-
ly applied by the EU Courts. The extensive judg-
ments in cases T‑219/10 Autogrill España v Commis-
sion and T‑399/11 Banco Santander and San-
tusa v Commission, followed by the appeal against
these judgements in joined cases C-20/15 P and
C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free, Banco San-
tander and Santusa (hereafter: World Duty Free) il-
lustrate this point in particular.3 This comment on
the Gibraltar judgement will take the reader along
the track that led from the ECJ’s reasoning in Gibral-
tar to the World Duty Free judgment and will take
into consideration some key developments in the
case law of the ECJ on the notion of material selec-
tivity.
II. The Selectivity Test: De Facto
Selectivity vs. Material Selectivity
An aid measure is selective when it favours certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods over
other undertakings.4 In cases of individual aid the
Commission can, without further analysis, decide
that there is de facto selectivity. In case of a general
measure the Commission has to establish whether
this measure confers “an advantage of general appli-
cation” and if so, whether this advantage is also se-
lective. The ECJ has construed in itsAdriaWien judg-
ment a three-tier test for determining whether gen-
eral tax schemes have a selective effect.5 This test is
called the “material selectivity test”. The first step for
the Commission is to determine whether a normal
tax system is based on a common legal framework
that applies without distinction and is applicable to
every market operator in the national territory. In
such a caseArticle 107(1) TFEU is not applicable. This
common legal framework is called the so-called “nor-
mal reference system”. The second step is to assess
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1 Case note on joined cases C-106/09P and C 107/09P Commission
and Kingdom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United
Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 2011 by P Rossi-Maccanico,
‘Gibraltar: beyond the pillars of Hercules of Selectivity’ (2012) 2
EStAL, 443-448.
2 Ibid., 448.
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sion v World Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016]
ECLI-981.
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Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-08365.
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whether a derogation from this normal reference sys-
tem leads to different treatment of undertakings,
which, given the objective of the general measure,
are in the same factual and legal situation. In case
there is an exception from the normal reference, this
measure constitutesapriori selective advantage. This
means that themeasure is selective, unless objective-
ly justifiedby theMemberState.Under these circum-
stances the Commission is required to assess, with-
in the third and last tier, whether this exception was
prescribed in the normal reference system and
whether the exception aims for a legitimate objective
andgiven this objective,whether undertakings in the
same factual and legal situation are treated different-
ly.6
III. The ECJ’s Judgement in Gibraltar
In 2002, the United Kingdom, on behalf of Gibral-
tar, notified its reformed corporate tax law system
to the Commission. This important reform con-
cerned provisions on payroll tax and taxation on
business property in Gibraltar. According to the
scheme, undertakings were obligated to pay taxes
only when making a profit, starting at a minimum
threshold of 15% of profits (the so-called “profit -
cap”). The Commission considered the tax scheme
to be selective, since the effect of both taxes inher-
ently favoured offshore companies which have no
real physical presence in Gibraltar and as a conse-
quence do not incur corporate tax. Therefore, the
Commission decided that the corporate tax scheme
constituted incompatible State aid.7 The Govern-
ment of Gibraltar brought an action for annulment
before the General Court. In Joined Cases T‑211/04
and T‑215/04 the General Court annulled the Com-
mission’s decision.8TheGeneral Court ruled that the
Commission had misapplied the three-tier material
selectivity test. More specifically, the General Court
ruled that theCommissionhad failed to demonstrate
that the specific taxes mentioned constituted dero-
gations from a normal system of reference, namely
the corporate tax system in Gibraltar.9 Therefore the
General Court reasoned that, given the autonomy of
Gibraltar to design its own tax system, the Commis-
sion was not allowed to determine whether the tax
scheme led to different treatment between a the
group of offshore undertakings and other undertak-
ings within the first tier.
Rossi-Maccanico critcised this lack of an effect-
based approach by the General Court.10 He argued
that the selectivity test also requires the Commission
to assess whether general applicable measures may
favour certain (groups) of undertakings. And indeed
on appeal the ECJ agreed with Rossi-Maccanico’s as-
sessment that the General Court had failed to consid-
er the effects. The ECJ made clear that the General
Court had interpreted the selectivity test too formal-
istic by giving too much room to the objective of
Gibraltar: introducing a general tax system for all
companies in Gibraltar.11 As a result the General
Court failed to appraise the discriminatory nature of
the tax regime as whole. Therefore the ECJ ruled that
the General Court had lost out of side the important
rule that Article 107(1) TFEU does not take into ac-
count the aims of State measures but solely the ef-
fects.12 More specifically the ECJ reversed the judg-
ment of the General Court concerning the applica-
tion of the material selectivity test. The ECJ ruled
that the General Court had misapplied the three-tier
test. According to the ECJ the Commission had right-
ly established that the corporate tax law system was
considered to be the national reference system. The
ECJ considered the corporate tax system in itself to
be de facto selective, since this system effectively
favoured “offshore” undertakings. As a result the
Commission was not obligated to investigate
whether the payroll and property taxes constituted
derogations, as these taxes constituted inherent ele-
ments of the normal system.13 Within the first tier
6 Joined cases C-106/09P and C 107/09P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113,[ [46, 149-150]. See also Case C‑270/15 P
Belgium v Commission [2016] ECLI-489; Case C‑518/13 and Case
C-100/15 P NMTA v Commission [2016] ECLI-254.
7 Commission Decision 2005/261/EC of 30 March 2004.
8 Joined Cases T‑211/04 and T‑215/04 Government of Gibraltar
and United Kingdom v Commission [2008] ECR II‑3745.
9 Joined Cases T‑211/04 and T‑215/04 Government of Gibraltar
and United Kingdom v Commission [2008] ECR II‑3745, [171].
10 P Rossi Maccanico, ‘Gibraltar and the Unsettled Limits of Selec-
tivity in Fiscal Aids’ (2009) 1 EStAL, 63 – 72.
11 Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113, [88].
12 Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113, [87-88, 95, 98].
13 Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113, [150].
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of the test the Commission is allowed to determine
whether the reference system is de facto selective.
The ECJ held that the fact that offshore companies
were not taxed, was an inevitable effect from the de-
sign of the general tax measure.14 These offshore
companies constituted a group of undertakings that
could only fulfil the conditions for avoiding taxation
due to their specific characteristics.15 Therefore the
general tax system was designed to treat this group
of undertakings preferentially because of the fact
that these companies, due to their nature, all fulfilled
the conditions.
IV. Developments in the Case Law of
the ECJ after the Gibraltar Judgment
1. The Purpose of Gibraltar: Solid as a
Rock or Affected by Erosion?
The clarity provided by the ECJ in Gibraltar on the
application of the selectivity criterion togeneral
schemes has allowed the ECJ in subsequent case law
to build a rock solid concept on which the selectivi-
ty test could find its roots. The ECJ continued to ap-
ply the effect-based approach beyond the domain of
fiscal aids.16 In the Case C-100/15 P NMTA, Case
C-518/13, Eventech, Case C-270/15 Belgium v Commis-
sion and Case C‑15/14 P Commission v MOL the ECJ
consistently held that that the concept of selectivity
in essence contains a non-discrimination test.17 De-
spite this apparent consistency in judicial review the
application of the material selectivity test has be-
comemore controversial in recent years.18The three-
tier analysis can prove difficult to assess for the re-
viewing EU Courts. Especially in its Autogrill and
Banco Santander judgments the General Court had
a hard time as concernss the distinction between the
first and second tier of the selectivity test.19 In cas-
esT- 219/10andT-399/11, theGeneralCourtwasasked
to annul Commission Decisions 2011/5/EC and
2011/282/EU.20 In these contesteddecisions theCom-
mission decided that a Spanish tax reduction of fi-
nancial goodwill for foreign shareholding acquisi-
tion (hereafter: “the tax amortisation”) constituted a
tax advantage and declared this measure incompat-
ible with the internal market.21 The Commission de-
cided that the measure was an exception to the gen-
eral applicable corporate tax scheme in Spain. The
measure allowed for undertakings to receive a tax
reduction on condition that these undertakings: (i)
are taxable in Spain; (ii) have acquired a sharehold-
ing in a “foreign” company of at least 5%of that com-
pany’s capital over the period of a year and; (iv) ac-
quire goodwill from that shareholding. Concerning
the first tier of the material selectivity test the Com-
mission decided that the reference framework, the
general corporate tax scheme, was not selective.
However in its assessment of the second tier the
Commission concluded that the tax amortisation
scheme constituted a derogation, which discriminat-
ed between two categories of undertakings in com-
parable situations.Although themeasurewas applic-
able to every taxable undertaking in Spain, under-
takings which acquire shareholdings abroad were
treated differently compared to undertakings that
did not acquire foreign shareholdings.22 Therefore
the measure seemed to favour export undertakings.
In its assessment of the measure the General Court
applied the same analytical method as the Commis-
sion, the material selectivity test, but came to a rad-
ically different outcome.23 The General Court con-
siders that the tax amortisation scheme is indeed a
derogation from the reference system, however it
14 Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113, [105].
15 Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and King-
dom of Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom
[2011] ECR I-11113, [107].
16 See for example Case C-279/08 P Netherlands v Commission
(NOx) [2011] ECR I-07671 and Case C‑518/13 Eventech [2015]
ECLI-9. These cases revolved around respectfully emission trade
schemes and public transport policies.
17 See Opinion AG Bobek, Case C‑270/15 P Belgium v Commission
[2016] ECLI-489, [101]; Case C‑518/13 Eventech [2015] ECLI-9,
[53-55]; Case C‑15/14 P Commission v MOL [2015] ECLI-362,
[59]; Case C-100/15 P NMTA v Commission [2016] ECLI-254,
[85-86].
18 See for instance the Opinion of AG Wathelet of 28 July 2016
concerning joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P Commission v
World Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa, [5].
19 Case T‑219/10 Autogrill España v Commission [2014] ECLI-939;
Case T‑399/11 Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission
[2014] ECLI-93853.
20 European Commission, Decisions 2011/5/EC, OJ 2011 L 7, p. 48;
European Commission, Decision 2011/282/EU OJ 2011 L 135,
p. 1.
21 See Articles 1(1) and 4 of Decision 2011/EC and Articles 1(1) and
4 of Decision 2011/282/EU.
22 See also the Opinion of AG Wathelet, joined cases C-20/15 P and
C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free, Banco Santander and
Santusa, [49].
23 See also the Opinion of AG Wathelet, joined cases C-20/15 P and
C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free, Banco Santander and
Santusa, [41].
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rules that the scheme does not make any distinction
between groups of undertakings. First of all, theGen-
eral Court considers that the measure does not
favour a group of undertakings, since the measure
is a priori available to any undertaking. Moreover
the General Court rules that the measure was not
aimedat anyparticular categoryofundertakings, but
at a category of economic transactions: namely the
purchase of particular financial assets.24 According
to the General Court, any undertaking taxable in
Spain could make such a transaction. Therefore the
General Court concludes that the Commission had
misapplied the second tier of the material selectivi-
ty test. The General Court reasoned that the Com-
mission had failed to prove any effects of the amor-
tisation tax scheme. It referred back to the Gibraltar
judgement and the ECJ’s effect-based approach. Ac-
cordingly the General Court held that the Commis-
sion should have identified any specific characteris-
tics of the beneficiary undertakings distinguishing
them from other undertakings.25 Therefore the Gen-
eral Court annulled the Commission’s Decision to
declare the amortisation scheme as incompatible
aid.26
2. Back to the Rock: the ECJ’s Judgment
inWorld Duty Free
On appeal in the case Commission vWorld Duty Free,
Banco Santander and Santusa (hereafter: World Du-
ty Free), the Commission contested the judgement
of the General Court in Autogrill and Santander con-
cerning the material selectivity test. TheWorld Duty
Free judgment provides an excellent overview on
how the selectivity criterion must be assessed by the
Commission and the EU Courts. The ECJ starts by
clearlydistinguishing the first tier (establishinganor-
mal reference system) from the second tier (estab-
lishing whether a derogation from the normal refer-
ence system is not discriminatory). To that end, the
ECJ first of all makes clear that this case is distinct
from the particular situation in Gibraltar in which
the normal reference system was in effect discrimi-
natory, de facto favouring offshore undertakings.27
The ECJ makes a distinction between determining
whether aid is de inherently selective and a priori se-
lective.28 In theGibraltar case the Commission ascer-
tained whether the normal reference system was de
facto discriminatory. According to the ECJ the Com-
mission may only in such a case determine the “spe-
cific characteristics” of those undertakings that are
inherently favoured by the scheme.29 Such an assess-
ment falls only within the first tier and definitely not
within the second tier of the material selectivity test.
The ECJ therefore considers that the General Court
misapplied this test, since it had decided that there
was no exception and therefore no a priori selectivi-
ty.30 Accordingly the ECJ held that the General Court
had failed to examine theeffects of thedifferent treat-
ment of undertakings. First of all, the concept of se-
lectivity also includes economic transactions per-
formed by undertakings. Therefore the ECJ agreed
with AGWathelet that the General Court had applied
an excessively formalistic and restrictive approach
in requiring the Commission to identify a specific
group of undertakings, rather than focusing on the
different treatment of undertakings in a comparable
situations.31 It sufficed to show that the tax reduc-
tion – as an exception to the general measure – had
the effect that Spanish undertakings, owning share-
holdings abroad would be treated preferentially. The
General Court could therefore not rule based on
Gibraltar that the Commission was required to iden-
tify specific characteristics, besides the conditions of
the amortisation scheme that would prove that a
24 Case T‑219/10 Autogrill España v Commission [2014] ECLI-939,
[53]; Case T‑399/11 Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission
[2014] ECLI-938, [53, 57].
25 Case T‑219/10 Autogrill España v Commission [2014] ECLI-939,
[64-68]; Case T‑399/11 Banco Santander and Santusa v Commis-
sion [2014] ECLI-93853, [68–72].
26 The General Court annulled the Commission’s decision to declare
the tax amortisation scheme as incompatible aid which had to be
recovered, as was stipulated in the Articles 1(1) and 4 of Decision
2011/3 in judgement T‑219/10 Autogrill España v Commission
[2014] ECLI-939, [85, 89] and the Articles 1(1) and 4 of Decision
2011/282/EU in judgment T‑399/11 Banco Santander and San-
tusa v Commission [2014] EU:T:2014:938, para. 89, 93.
27 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [54,
71].
28 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [74,
75].
29 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981,
[71-77].
30 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [65-
69].
31 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [104].
See Opinion of AG Wathelet in Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and
C‑21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free, Banco Santander and
Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [84-85].
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group of beneficiaries was treated preferentially.32
On the contrary, the ECJ finds that the Commission,
could conclude that the amortisation scheme,
through its effects, is a derogation which does not
treat all undertakings equally, as only undertakings
that have assets shareholdings abroad can apply for
a tax reduction.33 According to the ECJ, the General
Court erred in law, because of the fact that the Com-
mission had correctly applied the material selectivi-
ty test. The Court annuls the judgments of the Gen-
eral Court concerning the compatibility and refers
the case back to the General Court for the assessment
of Article 107(1) TFEU.34
IV. Concluding Remarks
In the end the judgement of the ECJ in Gibraltar re-
mains the clear landmark judgment for the correct
application of the selectivity criterion. It brought the
necessary clarity in the field of fiscal aids and has
contributed to the interpretationof the selectivity cri-
terion as a precondition for non-discrimination. In
World Duty Free, the ECJ prevented that the General
Court eroded the material selectivity test. The ECJ
made a clear distinction between determining a nor-
mal reference system on its inherent discriminatory
nature and determining a derogation of a normal ref-
erence systemby investigating the effects of themea-
sure to economic undertakings in a comparable sit-
uation. By doing so, the ECJ clarified the concept of
selectivity in line with the purpose of the Gibraltar
judgment. And in line with Rossi-Maccanico’s earli-
erdescription, theconceptofmaterial selectivitynow
truly rests on two pillars of Hercules: the judgments
in Gibraltar andWorld Duty Free.
32 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [78].
33 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981,
[79-82].
34 Joined Cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P Commission v World
Duty Free, Banco Santander and Santusa [2016] ECLI-981, [123].
